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Restricting Land Use in California by Rights
Of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter
By LEwis M. Snh4Es*
Avariety of legal devices are open to those who desire to impose
private restrictions upon the use of land.1 Among these are the cov-
enant running with the land at law, the equitable servitude and the
easement. However, this paper is concerned with two other legal
devices which have been widely used in American law, namely, the
right of entry for breach of condition and the possibility of reverter.
The subject of our inquiry is presented by the following question: Are
rights of entry and possibilities of reverter appropriate devices to
restrict land use in California?2
The right of entry-sometimes called the right of entry for breach
of condition, right of entry for condition broken, right of re-entry, or
power of terminations-is the interest created in the grantor when he
* A.B., 1909, Southwestern Coll.; Ph.B., 1912, J.D., 1914, Univ. of Chicago; J.S.D.,
1927, Yale Univ., LL.D., Southwestern Coll.; Professor of Law Emeritus, Univ. of Michi-
gan; Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law.
1 This paper concerns only restrictions on land use created by acts of interested
parties. It is, of course, possible to have restrictions on land use arising solely by operation
of law. Examples of these would be the zoning ordinance, and the rules of the common
law prohibiting the removal of lateral support of land or the commission of nuisance.
2 In general, on the subject of restricting land use by the right of entry or possibility
of reverter, see the following: HAmmoND, Limitations Upon Possibilities of Reverter and
Rights of Entry, CunRENr TRENDs IN STATE LEGISLATION 589 (1954); MAcELVEN, Pri-
vate Restrictions and Controls, CALIFORNIA LAN SEcxmiTy AND DEVELOPMENT 565
(CONT. ED. BAR 1960); SxNr~s & TAYLOR, THE LM RovEMNT OF CONV CANCI'G BY LEG-
IszATIoN 201 (1960); 1954 Proceedings, SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AM
Tnusr LAw 4 (A.B.A. 1954); Brake, Fees Simple Defeasible: the Purpose They Serve
with an Appraisal of Their Utility, 28 KY. L.J. 424 (1940); Clark, Limiting Land Re-
strictions, 27 A.B.A.J. 737 (1941); Ferrier, Determinable Fees and Fees upon Conditions
Subsequent, 24 CAliF. L. REV. 512 (1936); Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities
of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 HARv. L. REv. 248 (1940); Wil-
lianms, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Conditions Subsequent and Determinable Fees,
27 TE. L. REv. 158 (1948).
3 The term "power of termination" is used in the RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 24,
comment b (1936) to designate this interest. This is because the owner of such an in-
terest has a power and not a right, and because it is not necessary for him to exercise this
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conveys an estate in land on a common law condition subsequent.
While a right of entry can arise on a conveyance for life or for years,
4
we are here concerned only with the case where the conveyance is in
fee simple. Thus, A, the owner in fee simple, may make a conveyance
"'to B and his heirs, but upon the express condition that, if B or his suc-
cessor in interest should ever use the land for anything but residence
purposes, the grantor may enter and terminate the estate granted."
Here A has a right of entry for breach of condition; B has a fee simple
on condition subsequent. A possibility of reverter is the interest left
in the grantor who conveys land in determinable fee simple (otherwise
called a fee simple on a special limitation.) Thus, A, the owner in fee
simple, may make a conveyance "to B and his heirs so long as the land
is used for residence purposes." A has a possibility of reverter; B has
a determinable fee simple. Both the right of entry and the possibility
of reverter can be created only in the grantor, if created by deed; or
only in the heirs of the testator, if created by will.5
The right of entry is distinguished from the possibility of reverter
in that, upon the happening of the condition or limitation named in
the creating instrument, the fee simple does not automatically termi-
nate.6 The one having the right of entry must elect to forfeit the estate
conveyed. Originally this was accomplished by an actual entry upon
the land. But today, in most jurisdictions, including California,7 no
entry is necessary; a mere action to recover the possession' or to compel
a reconveyance from the grantee, is sufficient to constitute an election.
On the other hand, in the case of the possibility of reverter, the deter-
minable fee terminates automatically and without any election to for-
feit, the instant the event named in the creating instrument occurs.
power by an actual entry on the land. As to this usage, see Parry v. Berkeley Hall School
Foundation, 10 Cal. 2d 422, 426, 74 P.2d 738, 740, 114 A.L.R. 562, 564-65 (1937). The
interest of the owner of a right of entry has sometimes erroneously been called a right or
possibility of reverter, merely because, upon the election to forfeit, title will revest in such
owner. For this usage, see Taylor v. Continental So. Corp., 131 Cal. App. 2d 267, 280
P.2d 514 (1955).
4 In that case there would be a reversion in the grantor as well as a right of entry.
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 155, comment c (1936).
5 It is, of course, possible to create a fee simple subject to a divesting condition in
favor of a third party, but the third party has an executory interest, which, unlike the
right of entry or possibility of reverter, is subject to the rule against perpetuities.
6 For California cases recognizing this distinction, see Henck v. Lake Hemet Water
Co., 9 Cal. 2d 136, 140, 69 P.2d 849, 851 (1937); Taylor v. Continental So. Corp., 131
Cal. App. 2d 267, 276, 280 P.2d 514, 520 (1955).
" Firth v. Los Angeles Pac. Land Co., 28 Cal. App. 399, 152 Pac. 935 (1915); RE-
STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 24, comment b (1936), Special Note; SnmEs & SMITH, FUTrURsE
INTERESTS § 255 (1956).
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Objects in Imposing Restraints
Before taking up, one by one, the characteristics of these devices
which render them adaptable or unadaptable to the creation of re-
straints on land use, we must first determine what is the object sought
in imposing restraints. Only thus can it be ascertained whether the
various characteristics of these interests make them suitable for the
restrictions desired.
Objectives sought in restraining land use are, of course, varied. A
grantor may wish to make a gift to a charitable corporation to be effec-
tive if and only if a particular use is made of the land. In other words,
he wishes to make a gift with strings on it. In that case, either of these
devices is perfectly adapted to his purpose.8 Thus he may convey to
the X Church, its successors and assigns, so long as the land is used for
church purposes. In so doing he has created a determinable fee in the
church and a possibility of reverter in himself. The instant the named
use ceases, the fee simple revests in the grantor or his successor in in-
terest. The same thing may be accomplished effectively by the right
of entry, the difference being that the grantor or his successor in in-
terest must elect to forfeit when the condition of using the land for
church purposes is broken.
Or the grantor may desire to impose particular standards of moral
conduct upon his grantee. Thus the land may be conveyed on a con-
dition subsequent against its use for the sale or manufacture of alco-
holic liquors.9 Again the same thing may be accomplished by the
possibility of reverter. Here, also, the right of entry or possibility of
reverter seems to give the grantor a satisfactory device to accomplish
his purpose.
More often than not, however, a grantor creates a right of entry of
this sort, not for the purpose of imposing high ethical standards as
such, but to maintain the economic value and continued enjoyment of
other land which he retains in the neighborhood.1 The right of entry
may be conditioned on the construction or operation of a railway,
8 An example of such a condition is found in Papst v. Hamilton, 133 Cal. 631, 66
Pac. 10 (1901).
9 See Burdell v. Grandi, 152 Cal. 376, 92 Pac. 1022, 125 Am. St. Rep. 61, 14
L.R.A.(n.s.) 909 (1907), where the general principle is recognized, but under the peculiar
facts before the court, the condition was void because its purpose was to create a monop-
oly. In Townsend v. Allen, 114 Cal. App. 2d 291, 250 P.2d 292 (1952), although the trial
court found that the condition was intended to benefit land retained, the appellate court
suggested that it would have been valid had its purpose been to enforce the standards of
morality of the grantor.
20 See Parry v. Berkeley Hall School Foundation, 10 Cal. 2d 422, 74 P.2d 738, 114
A.L.R 562 (1937) (probably for the benefit of land retained but the opinion does not
specifically state); Townsend v. Allen, 114 Cal. App. 2d 291, 250 P.2d 292 (1952).
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which is expected to benefit the grantor's land.1' In these situations
it is not so clear that the devices are fully adapted to the purpose. For,
as is subsequently indicated,12 it may not be easy to have ownership of
the right of entry accompany ownership of the tract retained.
However, by far the most common purpose in employing one of
these land use restrictions is to maintain uniform standards for the
benefit of all tracts in a given subdivision. The subdivider may be in
the process of selling a large number of contiguous lots. Use restric-
tions are sought, requiring each lot owner to build only one single
dwelling on his lot, of at least a certain minimum value, and located at
least a certain number of feet back of the front line of the lot. Other
provisions may seek to regulate the planting of trees and shrubbery,
the location of fences, and the height of all structures. It is not uncom-
mon to find such restrictions in the form of covenants, inserted in all
deeds of conveyance of subdivision lots or embodied in a recorded dec-
laration to which all deeds refer. Then such provisions may be followed
by a declaration that all such restrictions are also conditions. Thus the
following clause- though not ideal draftsmanship, may be regarded as
typical: 13
[A] breach of any of the restrictions, provisions, conditions and cov-
enants hereinbefore referred to shall cause the real property upon
which said breach occurs to revert to said owners or their successors
in interest as owners of the reversionary rights herein provided for,
and the owners of such reversionary rights shall have the right of
immediate re-entry upon said real property in the event of any such
breach .. "
The purpose of the subdivider is normally to impose all restrictions
on each lot in the subdivision for the benefit of every other lot which
has already been purchased or which will be purchased in the future.
Thus, we may limit and rephrase the question previously proposed
as our subject of inquiry, as follows: Are rights of entry and possibil-
ities of reverter appropriate devices to restrict California land use in
a subdivision development? We shall endeavor to answer this ques-
11 In the following cases a condition subsequent requiring the operation of a railroad
on land conveyed was recognized as enforceable: Rosecrans v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 21 Cal.
2d 602, 134 P.2d 245 (1943); Liebrand v. Otto, 56 Cal. 242 (1880); Faus v. Pacific
Elec. Ry., 146 Cal. App. 2d 370, 303 P.2d 814 (1956); Firth v. Los Angeles Pac. Land
Co., 28 Cal. App. 399, 152 Pac. 935 (1915). In none of them is it expressly stated that
the condition was for the benefit of land retained by the grantor, but this is inferable or
is implied.
12 See subdivision 4, infra, in which the question of the persons who can enforce the
restriction is considered.
13 This language is taken from that contained in the instrument litigated in the case
of Childs v. Newfield, 136 Cal. App. 217, 219, 28 P.2d 924, 925 (1934).
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tion by considering, one by one, those characteristics of the two de-
vices which throw light on our problem.
1. What Kinds of Uses May Be Restricted by These Devices?
A wide variety of rights of entry which restrict land use have been
recognized by the California courts.'- Doubtlessly the same sort of
use restraints may be imposed by possibilities of reverter; although
very few cases involving such interests can be found.'5 Indeed, prac-
ticaly the only qualification to the proposition that any land use may
be restrained by a right of entry or possibility of reverter is that the
restraint must not be against public policy. Clearly, the usual types
of forfeiture restraints which are imposed in connection with convey-
ances of lots in subdivisions are recognized as valid. Thus, in Strong
v. Shatto,16 the court held valid certain conditions subsequent which
limited the use of the premises to residence purposes only, and pre-
scribed the nature, quality and cost of buildings to be erected thereon.
In its opinion, this statement is made:' 7
Respondents counsel concede, as we understand their argument, that
the conditions and reservations are precisely such as have been up-
held by the courts of this state in numerous decisions . . . [citing
cases].' 8 These authorities establish the doctrine that such conditions
of forfeiture are not against public policy....
Following the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
restrictions on the use of land by members of a particular race are un-
enforceable because any enforcement by the courts would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.' 9 And it is con-
ceivable that there might, in rare instances, be other conditions sub-
14 See generally 14 CAL. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (1954),
particularly §§ 56 and 126 of that title. Apparently, however, language in the form of a
right of entry or possibility of reverter, giving the grantor an option to repurchase, might
be construed as creating an option, and, therefore, subject to the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities. Alamo School Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 8 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960).
15 The first California decision expressly'recognizing the possibility of reverter is
Dabney v. Edwards, 5 Cal. 2d 1, 53 P.2d 962 (1935).
1645 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pao. 159 (1919).
17 Id at 31, 187 Pac. at 160.
28 The court cited four cases. Expressly declaring such conditions as these are valid
is Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 116 Pac. 729 Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 1190 (1911), one of
the cases cited.
29See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953), 4 HASTNCs L.J. 57 (1952); 1 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 98 (1953). The California Su-
preme Court had at one time taken the position that, although a restraint on the aliena-
tion of real property to the members of a particular race is void, a restraint on the use by
members of a particular race was valid. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186
Pae. 596, 9 A.L.R. 115 (1919). Such a restraint on use is now void under Cal. Stat.
1961, cc. 1078, 1877, 36 CAL. S. BAR J. 668 (Sept.-Oct., 1961).
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sequent which would be against public policy. Thus, it was held that
a condition inserted in conveyances of all lands in a given neighbor-
hood, except those retained by the grantor, prohibiting the sale of alco-
holic liquors on the land conveyed, was void as against public policy,
where its purpose was to give the grantor a monopoly in the sale of
alcoholic liquors on land retained by him.20 Lord Coke once declared
that, if a man make a conveyance in fee upon condition that the
grantee shall not take the profits of the land, the condition is void. 21
Without doubt a court would so hold, if such a deed should ever come
before it; but, so far as the writer knows, no such conveyance has ever
been litigated.
2. What Is the Effect of the Doctrine
That the Law Abhors a Forfeiture?
It is generally recognized that the courts dislike forfeitures, and
this doctrine is commonly applied to the divesting of ownership by
rights of entry and possibilities of reverter. 22 This attitude has been
manifested in three ways: (a) the court has construed language to
create a covenant or as mere surplusage; (b) the court has construed
the scope of the condition or limitation very narrowly, thus reaching
the conclusion that no breach has occurred; or (c) the court has found
that, although there is a condition and it has been broken, the grantor
is barred from enforcing a forfeiture because of waiver, estoppel or
changed circumstances.
Both in California and in other jurisdictions' 3 courts have gone
very far in refusing to find that the language of an instrument creates
a right of entry or possibility of reverter. Thus California courts have
indicated that: "[N]o provision in a deed relied on to create a condi-
tion subsequent will be so interpreted if the language of the provision
will bear any other reasonable construction."2 4 Moreover, they have
20 Burdell v. Grandi, 152 Cal. 376, 92 Pac. 1022, 125 Am. St. Rep. 61, 14 L.R.A. ( n.s.)
909 (1907).
21 2 COKE ON LITTLETON § 206b (1832). Also Sheppard's Touchstone, 131 (1820).
22 See SIMES & SmiTH, FurruRE INTERESTS §§ 248, 256 (1956). If the choice is be-
tween construing language as creating a right of entry or a possibility of reverter, the
former construction is preferred. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 45, comment m (1936).
23 For discussion of California cases to this effect see 7 HASTINGS L.J. 101 (1955).
Examples of such cases in other jurisdictions where the word condition was expressly
used, or where forfeiture was expressly provided for, are the following: Post v. Weil, 115
N.Y. 361, 22 N.E. 145, 5 L.R.A. 422, 12 Am. St. Rep. 809 (1889); W. F. White Land Co.
v. Christenson, 14 S.W.2d 369 (Tex Civ. App., 1928); President & Fellows of Middlebury
College v. Central Power Corp. of Vermont, 101 Vt. 325, 143 Atl. 384 (1928).
?4 Hawley v. Kafitz, 148 Cal. 393, 394, 83 Pac. 248, 249 (1905). Similar language
is found in Rosecrans v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 21 Cal. 2d 602, 134 P.2d 245 (1943); Behlow
v. Southern Pac. R.R., 130 Cal. 16, 62 Pac. 295 (1900); Cullen v. Sprigg, 83 Cal. 56, 23
Pac. 222 (1890); Hasman v. Union High School, 76 Cal. App. 629, 245 Pac. 464 (1926).
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cited the following provision of the California Civil Code in support
of this proposition: "A condition involving a forfeiture must be strictly
interpreted against the person for whose benefit it is created."2 5 Thus,
a mere statement of purpose is not sufficient to create a condition.
2 6
Nor is the statement of something as the consideration for the convey-
ance sufficient to imply a condition.2 7 Indeed, even the use of the
word "condition" may not be sufficient to create a condition.2 On the
other hand, California courts have more than once declared that no
express language of forfeiture is necessary in order to create a right of
entry,29 although such language is always used by careful draftsmen.30
The tendency to adopt a construction giving narrow scope to the
condition has been manifested in several ways. Thus a condition re-
quiring a particular use has been held to be performed if the use has
continued for a reasonable time.3 1 And particular language has been
held to indicate that the condition was to be for the benefit of the
grantor personally, and so was intended to continue only during his
lifetime.32
But by far the most significant restrictive interpretation of condi-
tions inserted in conveyances of subdivision lots is that which regards
the restriction as intended only for the benefit of other land in the
vicinity retained by the grantor.83 If that construction is adopted,
25 CAL. Cr. CODE § 1442. Although this section appears in the Code in Division 3
on Obligations and not in Division 2 on Property, it has many times been cited by the
California courts as if applicable to conveyances of real property. To this effect, see the
following: Mitchell v. Cheney Slough Irr. Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 138, 134 P.2d 34 (1943);
Aller v. Berkeley High School, 40 Cal. App. 2d 31, 103 P.2d 1052 (1940); Wedum-
Aldahl Co. v. Miller, 18 Cal. App. 2d 745, 64 P.2d 762 (1937); Hasman v. Union High
School, 76 Cal. App. 629, 245 Pac. 464 (1926); Whitaker v. Regents of the University
of California, 39 Cal. App. 111, 178 Pac. 308 (1918).
28 Fitzgerald v. County of Modoc, 164 Cal. 493, 129 Pac. 794 (1913).
27 Hawley v. Kafitz, 148 Cal. 393, 83 Pac. 248 (1905); Behlow v. Southern Pac. Ry.,
130 Cal. 16, 62 Pac. 295 (1900).
28 See Victoria Hospital Ass'n v. All Persons, 169 Cal. 455, 147 Pac. 124 (1915).
29See Rosecrans v. Pacifi Elec. Ry., 21 Cal. 2d 602, 134 P.2d 245 (1943); Fitz-
gerald v. County of Modoc, 164 Cal..493, 129 Pac. 794 (1913); Papst v. Hamilton, 133
Cal. 631, 66 Pac. 10 (1901); Taylor v. Continental So. Corp., 131 Cal. App. 2d 267, 280
P.2d 514 (1955). But compare Hasman v. Union High School, 76 Cal. App. 629, 245
Pac. 464 (1926).
so See a suggested form for a condition subsequent with right of entry in 7 HAsTINGs
L.J. 101 (1955). It should be noted that words of reverter are entirely unnecessary in
the creation of a determinable fee with possibility of reverter.
31Booth v. County of Los Angeles, 124 Cal. App. 259, 12 P.2d 72 (1932) (per-
formance for 32 years); Hasman v. Union High School, 76 Cal. App. 629, 245 Pac. 464
(1926) (performance for 29 years). But compare Rosecrans v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 21 Cal.
2d 602, 134 P.2d 245 (1943).
32 Savanna School Dist. v. McLeod, 137 Cal. App. 2d 491, 290 P.2d 593 (1955).
3 3 See, for example, Alexander v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d 488, 119
P.2d 992 (1941), and discussion in this paper under subdivision 4, infra.
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then, as soon as the grantor has parted with the other land for the
benefit of which the condition was created, the condition is at an end.
It would seem that, if the condition is drawn in the form already indi-
cated in this paper as typical-namely preceded by restrictive cove-
nants, after which the condition is to the effect that all such covenants
are also conditions-this construction is inevitable. For, it is regularly
held, in this state, that equitable restrictions in the form of covenants
must be for the benefit of particularly designated land. And if the
covenants are for the benefit of other lands, then the conditions would
necessarily be intended to benefit the same lands. Thus, as is more
fully developed in the discussion which follows,3 4 it will generally be
true that, as soon as the subdivider has disposed of all his lots the con-
ditions are no longer enforceable.
Finally, even though the court is obliged to construe the language
as creating a condition, and even though the narrowest possible con-
struction of its scope has been adopted, the court may still refuse to
recognize a forfeiture because the grantor, by his conduct, has waived
the breach or is estopped to enforce it. 35 This may be because he has
permitted a breach of precisely the same condition which was inserted
in other lots in the subdivision, 3 or because he has, contrary to his
representations, conveyed other lots in the subdivision freed from the
conditionY. 7 It is easy to see why such facts may show waiver or estop-
pel in the case of enforcing equitable restrictions in the nature of cov-
enants. But it is arguable that the way in which other lots in the
subdivision are dealt with should be immaterial on a question of the
enforcement of a condition inserted in the conveyance of a particular
lot. That, however, is not the way the California courts have looked at
it. And, indeed, if it can be said that the condition, by its terms, only
continues so long as the corresponding covenant is enforceable, then
this conclusion is inescapable.
It should be pointed out that under California decisions, a right of
entry may terminate because of changed circumstances in the same
manner as an equitable servitude. This characteristic, however, would
seem to render it more valuable as a device in subdivision develop-
ment, not less valuable. For, if circumstances have so changed that it
34 See subdivision 4, infra.
35 Atkins v. Anderson, 139 Cal. App. 2d 918, 294 P.2d 727 (1956); Townsend v.
Allen, 114 Cal. App. 2d 291, 250 P.2d 292 (1952); Alexander v. Title Ins. & Trust
Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d 488, 119 P.2d 992 (1941); Wedum-Aldahl Co. v. Miller, 18 Cal.
App. 2d 745, 64 P.2d 762 (1937); Bernstein v. Minney, 96 Cal. App. 597, 274 Pac. 614
(1929); Brown v. Wrightrnan, 5 Cal. App. 391, 90 Pac. 467 (1907).
36 Wedum-Aldahl Co. v. Miller, 18 Cal. App. 2d 745, 64 P.2d 762 (1937).
37 Maderis v. Pattavina, 46 Cal. App. 2d 615, 116 P.2d 495 (1941); see Brown
v. Wrightman, 5 Cal. App. 391, 90 Pac. 467 (1907).
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is unreasonable to enforce the condition, then it ceases to be of value
to maintain the character of the subdivision, and becomes merely a
clog on alienability of all lots subject to it. As is subsequently pointed
out, this doctrine enables the lot owner to get rid of the clog.38
In spite of the hostility of the courts toward forfeitures, there is a
substantial number of California decisions which have recognized the
validity of conditions subsequent and have approved forfeitures there-
under.3 9 Moreover, decisions can be found in which the defense of
waiver or estoppel has been denied.40 A leading case in which a for-
feiture was held to be justified is Rosecrans v. Pacific Elec. Ry.41 There
the deed provided for a number of conditions in connection with the
grant of a railroad right of way, continuing with the following:42
The aforesaid right of way is granted upon the further express con-
dition that the second party or his assigns shall establish and main-
tain over the railway to be constructed as hereinbefore provided, a
daily service of not less than 18 local passenger cars or passenger
trains each way;... Each of the conditions hereinbefore stated...
is hereby declared to be a condition and not a personal covenant.
Then followed express language of forfeiture for breach. The court
held that the deed created a condition and not a covenant and that it
was not performed by operating trains in the manner stated for a
period of more than thirty years. From this and other decisions in this
state, it is fair to conclude that the hostility of the courts toward for-
feitures does not preclude their availability as devices to restrict the
use of land.
3. Are the Legal Sanctions Appropriate?
Are the modes provided by law for enforcing the condition subse-
quent or special limitation on behalf of the owner of the right of entry
or possibility of reverter appropriate to accomplish his purpose? In
the case of land use restrictions to maintain the standards in a subdi-
vision, a forfeiture will rarely accomplish what is desired. Rather in
such a case the interested parties want specific performance by the
38 See 5 (b) (iii), infra.
so To that effect are the following: Parry v. Berkeley Hall School Foundation, 10 Cal.
2d 422, 74 P.2d 738, 114 A.L.R. 562 (1937); Quatman v. McCray, 128 Cal. 295, 60 Pac.
855 (1900); Parsons v. Smilie, 97 Cal. 647, 32 Pac. 702 (1893); Liebrand v. Otto, 56
Cal. 242 (1880); Biescar v. Czechoslovak-Patronat, 145 Cal. App. 2d 133, 302 P.2d 104
(1956); Faus v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 146 Cal. App. 2d 370, 303 P.2d 814 (1956); Firth v.
Los Angeles Pac. Land Co., 28 Cal. App. 399, 152 Pac. 935 (1915).
40 Quatman v. McCray, 128 Cal. 295, 60 Pac. 855 (1900); Los Angeles L. & W. Co.
v. Kane, 96 Cal. App. 418, 274 Pac. 380 (1929).
4121 Cal. 2d 602, 134 P.2d 245 (1943).
42 Id. at 604, 134 P.2d at 246.
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fee owner. This is, of course, exactly what can be accomplished with
the equitable servitude in the nature of a covenant. But there is no
such thing as going into equity to compel the grantee to perform a
condition. The right of entry or possibility of reverter simply has the
effect of holding a club over the head of the grantee and saying: If
you do not perform, you lose your property. 4a This may, of course, be
a very effective club. But if the grantee violates the condition, the
grantor has no practical alternative but to receive the property back.
Indeed, if the possibility of reverter had been used, the grantor could
not even elect not to forfeit; the title comes back whether he wants it
or not. Though, in the case of the right of entry, the grantor, as a
matter of law, has the election to take the property back or not, his
situation is not much better. For if he does not elect to forfeit, he may
well be held to have waived the condition and thus left his grantee
with a fee simple absolute.
4. Can These Interests Be Held or Enforced
By the Lot Owners of the Subdivision?
Clearly the owners of the lots in the subdivision are the persons
most interested in enforcing use restrictions. Yet it is elementary that
rights of entry and possibilities of reverter can be created by deed only
in the grantor, and not in a third party.44 Thus, the subdivider will
have these interests. But as soon as he has sold all the lots, he will
cease to have any motive for enforcing the restrictions. Assuming that
the deeds creating the rights of entry or possibilities of reverter can
be, and are, so worded that these interests can continue to exist after
the grantor has ceased to own other land in the vicinity, the subdivider
might assign these interests to a trustee for the benefit of all lot owners;
or an incorporated improvement association could be formed by all lot
owners and these interests assigned to it.
While there may be practical objections to this procedure, the ini-
tial question to be answered is: Are rights of entry and possibilities of
reverter alienable? There is no doubt about rights of entry; the Cali-
fornia statute expressly makes them alienable.45 Possibilities of reverter
are also believed to be alienable in California, although there is no stat-
43 But see CAL. Civ. CODE § 3275, which provides for relief against forfeiture under
the terms of an obligation by "making full compensation to the other party." It is be-
lieved that this provision concerns only contractual obligations; but see Atkins v. Ander-
son, 139 Cal. App. 2d 918, 294 P.2d 727 (1956), where the court regarded it as appli-
cable to a condition subsequent involved in a conveyance of land.
44 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 154, 155 (1936). See also, Perry v. Berkeley Hall
School Foundation, 10 Cal. 2d 422, 74 P.2d 738, 114 A.L.R. 562 (1937); Alamo School
Dist. v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960).
45 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1046.
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ute or decision squarely to that effect. 40 According to the Restatement
of Property, possibilities of reverter are alienable.47 But there is some
American authority to the contrary.48 A California statute provides
that "Future interests pass by succession, will and transfer, in the same
manner as present interests."49 But the question at once arises: Are
possibilities of reverter future interests, or are they mere possibilities?
It is believed that they are future interests, just as certainly as rights
of entry,5 ° which have been held to be devisable under this section.51
Probably the only reason why the California statute expressly provided
for the transferability of rights of entry, and said nothing about possi-
bilities of reverter, was that at the time the statute was enacted, it was
not clear whether such interests could be created at all.52
But, even though we get over the hurdle of alienability, as doubt-
less we would, the machinery of enforcing rights of entry or possibil-
ities of reverter through a trustee or an improvement association would
be somewhat cumbersome, to say the least. And, of course, it is ob-
vious that an assignment directly to the lot owners would be wholly
impracticable as a solution.5 3
40 See 31 CAL. Jun. 2d Life Estates § 37 (1956).
4 7 
RSTATEumT, PriOPERTY § 159 (1936).
48 See SJMEs & SM-rm, FurruR INTEREsTS § 1860 (1956), where the cases are col-
lected.
4 9 CAL. Crv. CoDE § 699.
5o See Verrall, Future Interests in California, in 7 WzsT's CAL. Civ. CODE ANN.
1 at 13-17 (2nd vol. 1954).
51 Johnston v. City of Los Angeles, 176 Cal. 479, 168 Pac. 1047 (1917).
52 John Chipman Gray, in his book on the Rule Against Perpetuities, contended that,
after the English statute, Quia Emptores, 12 Edw. I, c.1 (1290), there could be no such
thing as a possibility of reverter. But no American case has so held, and numerous Amer-
ican cases recognize the existence of possibilities of reverter. As to this see Gs y, THE
RULE AGAINST PEPnrETurms 712 (4th ed. 1942); Snws & Smr, Ftrun INTMSTS
§ 283 (1956); Powell, Deternzinable Fees, 23 CoLuM. L. REnv. 207 (1923); Vance, Rights
of Reverter and the Statute Quia Emptores, 36 YALE L.J. 593 (1927).
53 Practical difficulties would be experienced (a) in transferring the right of entry
created by the subdivider with respect to each lot, to the owners of all the other lots in
equal undivided shares; and (b) in determining how the power to forfeit should be exer-
cised by a group of co-owners of the right of entry. Doubtless the doctrine of the Eng-
lish common law to the effect that a right of entry is indivisible, would not be recognized
today. As to that see 3 RESTAT mNT, PROPERTY § 161, comment g, and Appendix, p. 27
(1936). But if a subdivider creates a right of entry in himself with respect to one lot,
he cannot transfer that right of entry to all other lot owners by the same instrument, for
the language by which that is attempted would be construed as an executory interest or
power of appointment and would be subject to the rule against perpetuities. See RE-
STAT mT, PROPERTY § 24, comments c and d (1936). But compare Brown v. Terra
Bella Irrigation Dist., 51 Cal. 2d 33, 330 P.2d 775 (1958). Suppose, however, X, a sub-
divider, has one hundred lots in his subdivision and has already conveyed ten of these
by deeds which created in the grantor a right of entry with respect to each lot conveyed.
When X, subsequently, conveys the eleventh lot to K, he can assign to him an undivided
Feb., 19621 RIGHTS OF ENTRY AND REVERTER
However, before assuming that the trust or the corporation can be
successfully employed to give the benefit of use restrictions in the
nature of rights of entry to the lot owners, reference again must be
made to the line of cases to the effect that, since the restriction is for
the benefit of other land in the subdivision, and since the right of entry
can only be created in the subdivider, the right of entry ceases when
the subdivider sells all his lots. Apparently, this doctrine is part and
parcel of a general tendency apparent in the California decisions to
treat rights of entry, so far as possible, like equitable servitudes. One
of the strongest decisions to this effect is Young v. Cramer,54 in which
this statement occurs: ". . . [I]t is recognized by the law writers that
the majority view is to the effect that such restrictions and conditions
as those now before us can be enforced only by the owner of a part of
the land for the benefit of which the restrictions and conditions were
created." [Emphasis added.] 5 In Alexander v. Title Ins. & Trust
Co.,56 the court, after referring to the fact that "the reversionary right
is held by an entity which is not the owner of the land in the same
tract and cannot claim that its right as landowner would be adversely
affected as to use or value by removal of the restriction,"57 said: "It
interest in the rights of entry as to the ten lots already conveyed. But he can not assign to
K interests in the fights of entry involving the use of the eighty-nine lots not yet con-
veyed, since those rights of entry are not yet created.
But suppose the subdivider waits until all the lots have been conveyed subject to the
rights of entry, and then executes an instrument conveying an undivided interest as a
tenant in common in the right of entry held against each lot, to the owner of each of the
other lots. The question still remains: how are the rights of entry to be enforced? Could
each lot owner separately exercise his right of entry as to his undivided share and thus
forfeit only that share? Clearly that would be impracticable and inequitable. In all prob-
ability the courts would not permit it. See Jameson v. Chanslor-Canfield Midway Oil
Co., 176 Cal. 1, 167 Pac. 369 (1917). Would it be necessary to have the concurrence of
all co-owners of a right of entry before a forfeiture could be secured? The law on this
point is not clear.
What has been said about divesting some undivided interests in a lot and not others
applies only to the right of entry and not to the determinable fee. If a determinable fee
with a possibility of reverter is used, the determinable fee will end all at once and revest
at one time in the co-owners of the possibility of reverter. This is because the owner of a
possibility of reverter has no election to forfeit; if the named event happens, title revests
in him whether he desires it not.
In general, as to the questions raised in this note, see 2 RESTATEm:ENT, PROPErTY,
Appendix, p. 23 (1936); 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 282 (1950); SwmS & SMrrH, Fu-
TURE INTERESTS § 264 (1956). And compare Borgwardt, Vertical Subdivision-the Con-
dominum, 36 CAL. S. BAR J. 603, 611 (1961), where the author does propose that re-
versionary interests in a cooperative apartment of the sort he is discussing be given di-
rectly to other apartment owners, without the use of a trust or corporation to hold these
interests for the benefit of apartment owners.
5438 Cal. App. 2d 64, 100 P.2d 523 (1940).
5 Id. at 68, 100 P.2d at 525.
5648 Cal. App. 2d 488, 119 P.2d 992 (1941).
57 Id. at 492, 119 P.2d at 994.
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may be questioned whether such a restriction may be enforced by any-
one other than the owner of part of the land for the benefit of which
the restriction was imposed."S8 Other cases have indicated the same
viewpoint somewhat less strongly. " On the other hand, in a decision
of the federal court involving California use restrictions,60 the court
sharply distinguished between rights of entry and equitable servitudes,
and indicated that the former existed without reference to ownership
by the grantor of any adjoining land. In other California decisions, use
restrictions have been held to be enforceable without any indication in
the statement of facts as to whether the person bringing the action
retained any adjoining land which would be benefited by the right of
entry. 1 It would seem that a deed could be so drawn as to indicate
expressly that the right of entry created is for the benefit of the grantor
and his heirs, devisees and assigns, without regard to his ownership
of any adjacent land. Certainly there is no such thing as a right of
entry being "appurtenant" to other land, although an easement or
servitude commonly is appurtenant. But the fact remains, that, in the
light of the California decisions, the creation of a right of entry re-
straining the use of land in a subdivision without reference to land
retained presents a difficult problem in draftsmanship.
5. Are These Devices Likely to Tie Up Titles
For an Indefinite Time?
Up to this point, we might well say this: Though, in some respects,
these devices are not too well adapted to the purpose of restricting
land use in a subdivision, yet, if they are coupled with equitable servi-
tudes, they may supplement the latter, and, in any event, can do no
harm. If, however, they tie up titles indefinitely and make land un-
marketable, then they should be avoided. For a number of reasons;
this may be true.
(a) Will Title Depend Upon Facts Extrinsic to the Record?
One difficulty with the use of the possibility of reverter or right of
entry, as these interests exist at common law, is that the happening of
the event or condition upon which the grantee's title terminates or is
terminable depends upon facts extrinsic to the record. It is, of course,
everywhere recognized that, so far as possible, the state of the title to
58 Ibid.
5 See Childs v. Newfield, 136 Cal. App. 217, 28 P.2d 924 (1934); Kent v. Koch,
166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333 P.2d 411 (1928).
60 Los Angeles University v. Swarth, 107 Fed. 798 (9th Cir. 1901).
61 See Firth v. Marovich, 160 Cal. 257, 116 Pac. 729, Ann. Cas. 1912 D 1190
(1911); Quatman v. MeCray, 128 Cal. 285, 60 Pac. 855 (1900); Rice v. Heggy, 158
Cal. App. 2d 89, 322 P.2d 53 (1958).
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land should be discoverable from the record. If the title depends upon
such a fact as the erection of structures or the use of the premises for
the sale of alcoholic liquors or for business purposes then we must go
outside the record to ascertain this. Indeed, even an extrinsic investi-
gation may not disclose the facts, if a prohibited use sufficient to justify
a forfeiture or termination has already occurred but has ceased, so that
an investigation would not now disclose it. The problem is somewhat
less acute, however, in California, due to the following statute: "Where
a grant is made upon condition subsequent, and is subsequently de-
feated by the nonperformance of the condition, the person otherwise
entitled to hold under the grant must reconvey the property to the
grantor or his successors, by grant, duly acknowledged for record." 62
Of course, if this is done, and if the reconveyance is recorded, then
record title will be complete in this particular. But there is no com-
parable statute with respect to the happening of the event named as
the limitation of a determinable fee.
(b) How Can Title Be Cleared of a Condition or Limitation
Which Has Become Obsolete, If There Has Been No Breach?
One of the objections to the use of the right of entry or possibility
of reverter is that, if the restraint on land use becomes obsolete, then
it is merely a clog on the title. When building restrictions-even if
imposed by rights of entry or possibilities of reverter-enforce a reason-
able use of the premises, purchasers are not very likely to object to
them as clouds on title. But the moment the enforced use becomes
unreasonable-for example, the moment the land restricted to resi-
dence uses becomes a part of a larger area devoted to business pur-
poses-the restriction is going to be regarded as objectionable.
(i) As has already been noted, although a right of entry or possi-
bility of reverter is essentially a contingent interest, it is not subject to
the Rule Against Perpetuities in the United States.63 California au-
thority is in accordance with that view. 64 In several states legislation
has been enacted, restricting the duration of these interests, 65 but none
exists in California. Of course, it would be entirely possible to insert
62 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1109.
63 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 372 (1944); SiMas & SMiTH, FuTURE INTERESTS §§
1238-39 (and cases therein cited) (1956).
64 Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1919). See also, Brown v. Terra
Bella Irrigation Dist., 51 Cal. 2d 33, 330 P.2d 775 (1958) and Alamo School Dist. v.
Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1960). Other California cases could be
cited in which a right of entry which might not vest within the period of the rule against
perpetuities was held valid, but the rule against perpetuities was not mentioned. See,
for example, Rosecrans v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 21 Cal. 2d 602, 134 P.2d 245 (1943).
65 These statutes are discussed in SIMES & TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEY-
ANCING BY LEGISLATION 205-213 (1960).
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in the creating deed a provision to the effect that the right of entry or
possibility of reverter should come to an end after a stated period of
time-say forty or fifty years.
(ii) If the owner of the right of entry or possibility of reverter
could be found, the owner of the fee simple might buy him out and
secure a release. For whatever question there may be in other states
about the alienability of these interests, they are held to be releasable
to the fee simple owner; 6 and, in California, the statute which makes
them transferable would make them releasable. If the owner of the
right of entry or possibility of reverter has died intestate, his heirs
could execute a release of the interest. But how would the heirs be
determined? According to the preferred view in the United States, a
right of entry or possibility of reverter passes by descent in the same
way as a possessory fee simple. 67 There is little doubt but that these
interests would pass thus by descent in California,"" although there are
a very few decisions in other states to the effect that they pass "by rep-
resentation," and thus a group different from those who inherit a fee
simple in possession would have the power to execute a release. But
even if the appropriate group to execute the release can be found with-
out difficulty, the persons constituting it will probably expect to be
paid something for the release, and thus the owner of the fee simple
has in effect been forced to buy in an outstanding encumbrance.
(iii) Can the doctrine of changed circumstances be applied to
terminate an obsolete right of entry or possibility of reverter? It has
long been recognized in California and elsewhere, 9 that an equitable
servitude is rendered unenforceable and void, if a change in the cir-
cumstances of the surrounding neighborhood makes it inequitable to
enforce it; and that, in such a case, a court of equity will quiet the title
in the grantee freed from the restriction. Outside of California, there
has been little tendency to apply this doctrine to the termination of
rights of entry.70 It is true, here as elsewhere, if the change in circum-
stances has been brought about by the affirmative acts of the person
holding a right of entry, he may be held to have waived it or to be
estopped from asserting it. But the California decisions go further,
and, regardless of whether the grantor may or may not have been to
blame for the change in circumstances, have recognized that the court
66 REsTATmvnmr, PROPERTY § 161, comment c (1936).
67 RESTATEMMNT, PROPERTY § 164, comment c (1936); 1 AM2aUCAN LAW OF PROP-
ERrY § 4.74 (1952).
68 CAL. CrV. CODE § 699, and see note 50, supra. But compare Upinton v. Corrigan,
151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359, 37 L.R.A. 794 (1896).
60 Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 (1931); 2 AMERCAN LA w
OF PROPERTY § 9.39 and cases therein cited (1952).
70SMS & SMTr, FurTrE INnTmESTS § 1992 (1956).
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can declare the right of entry terminated. 1 In Strong v. Shatto, 2 per-
haps the first case in which the point was raised in this state with re-
spect to a right of entry, the court sought to differentiate building
restrictions in equitable servitudes from those arising from conditions
subsequent, and indicated that only the former could be terminated
by the changed circumstances doctrine. But in a retrial of the same
case, with a substituted complaint by another lot owner, the trial court
found that the changes in circumstances were not sufficient to justify
a holding that the conditions had terminated. The supreme court,
while recognizing the doctrine of changed circumstances, felt obliged
to affirm the trial court because of the findings of fact which it had
made. 73 In the concurring opinion, as well as in a decision four years
later, the court recognized that the result in Strong would no longer
be reached because of procedural changes in the law, and that the
doctrine of changed circumstances is to be applied to rights of entry
in a proper cased
4
It would seem that, in this state, the doctrine of changed circum-
stances can be relied upon to avoid much of the objection that obsolete
conditions subsequent become a serious defect in the title. Of course,
the changed circumstances are facts outside the record; and in order
to make a clear record title, something in the nature of a quiet title
suit would have to be brought.
Whether the California courts would apply the changed circum-
stances doctrine to the possibility of reverter has not been determined.
It may be argued that it would be more difficult to do this with respect
71 Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 (1931); Hirsch v. Hancock,
173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 343 P.2d 949 (1959); Atkins v. Anderson, 139 Cal. App. 2d 918,
249 P.2d 727 (1956) (as pointed out in LEACH & LOGAN, CASES ON FurtrrE INTERESTS
AND ESTATE PLANNING 59-63 (1961), this appears to be an executory interest void under
the Rule Against Perpetuities, but apparently neither court nor counsel were aware of
this); Townsend v. Allen, 114 Cal. App. 2d 291, 250 P.2d 292 (1952), noted in 42
CALIF. L. REv. 194 (1954) (also put on ground that intended for benefit of lands of
grantor later disposed of); Wedum-Aldahl Co. v. Miller, 18 Cal. App. 2d 745, 64 P.2d
762 (1937) (also put on ground of waiver and estoppel); Forman v. Hancock, 3 Cal.
App. 2d 291, 39 P.2d 249 (1934); Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P.2d 496
(1932); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Star Petroleum Co., 93 Cal. App. 437, 269 Pac. 722 (1928).
In the following cases, the principle was recognized, but the court concluded that the
change in circumstances was not sufficient to justify a holding that the condition had
terminated: Strong v. Hancock, 201 Cal. 530, 258 Pac. 60 (1927); Rice v. Heggy, 158
Cal. App. 2d 89, 322 P.2d 53 (1958); Faus v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 146 Cal. App. 2d 370,
303 P.2d 814 (1956); Biescar v. Czechoslovak-Patronat, 145 Cal. App. 2d 133, 302 P.2d
104 (1956).
7245 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1919).
73 Strong v. Hancock, 201 Cal. 530, 258 Pac. 60 (1927).
74 See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Shenk in Strong v. Hancock, 201 Cal. 530,
553, 258 Pac. 60, 70 (1927), cited with approval in Hess v. Country Club Park, 213
Cal. 613, 615, 2 P.2d 782, 783 (1931).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13
RIGHTS OF ENTRY AND REVERTER
to such an interest than in the case of a right of entry. 5 On the other
hand, it is equally desirable to get rid of possibilities of reverter when
they become obsolete as restraints on use. It would appear that re-
writing the terms of a reversionary interest by judicial action should
be no more difficult than rewriting the terms of a covenant inserted in
a deed, when either interest has become obsolete.
Conclusion
While in some respects the right of entry, and perhaps also the
possibility of reverter, is better adapted to the imposition of use re-
straints in a subdivision development in California than in most other
states, the subdivider should, in most cases, be satisfied with the equi-
table servitude to accomplish his ends. For the equitable servitude,
if set up with careful draftsmanship, can enable every lot owner in the
subdivision to enforce restrictions on every other lot owner; but it is
not easy to confer these same benefits satisfactorily by means of rights
of entry or possibilities of reverter. Even if this should be accom-
plished, the mode of enforcement, by forfeiture or divestment, seems
inappropriate. But most important of all, the right of entry or possi-
bility of reverter may survive its usefulness, and live on only as a clog
on the alienability of real property.
75 See Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict
the Use of Land, 54 HAzv. L. REv. 248, 271-75 (1940), where the author regards it as
somewhat more difficult to apply the doctrine of changed circumstances to possibilities
of reverter, but indicates that it would be desirable to do so.
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